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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A. The State Having Failed To Appeal From The Sentence Imposed On June 9.
2010. May Not Now Argue That It Was Entered Without Jurisdiction
Mr. Moore set forth in his Opening Brief that the District Court was without jurisdiction
to enter the Second Amended Judgment on October 7, 2010. Appellant's Opening Brief, pages
4-8. The State has not disputed this but has argued instead that the District Court was without
jurisdiction to enter the June 9, 2010, sentence. Respondent's Brief, pages 7-11.
However, the State's arguments about the June 9, 2010, sentence are simply too late and
should be rejected by this Court.
IAR 14 provides that an appeal from the District Court must be taken within 42 days from
the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on the judgment or order of that
court. And, it has been repeatedly held that the requirement of perfecting an appeal within the
42-day time limit is jurisdictional. State v. Tucker, l 03 Idaho 885, 655 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1982);
State v. Prieto, 120 Idaho 884, 820 P.2d 1241 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho
580, 199 P.3d 155 (2008).
While it is true that jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, State v. Easier, 149 Idaho
664,666,239 P.3d 462,465 (Ct.App. 2010), it is nonetheless necessary that a court have
jurisdiction to consider a challenge to jurisdiction. State v. Wegner, 148 Idaho 270, 271-2, 220
P .3d 1089, 1090-1 (2009).
In Wegner, two and a half years after the remittitur was issued in the criminal case,
Wegner filed a Rule 33 motion to withdraw his guilty plea to correct a manifest injustice arguing
that he could not have been found guilty because the District Court which accepted his plea

lackedjurisdiction over him. 148 Idaho at 271,220 P.3d at 1090.
The Supreme Com1 held that, "irrespective of the merits" of the claim that the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to accept the plea, the issue could not be addressed because the District
Court was without jurisdiction to hear the Rule 33 motion. The Com1 quoted State v. Jakoski:
Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to
amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by
expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal.
139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003), quoted at 148 Idaho 272, 220 P.3d 1091. See also,
State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (Jurisdiction terminated when
court did not retain jurisdiction pursuant to statute nor was any appeal taken).
Once a criminal case is final because neither side has filed a notice of appeal within 42
days, there are only limited means of challenging jurisdiction. One is by filing a Criminal Rule
35 motion alleging an illegal sentence. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252 P.3d 1255 (2011).
And, another is through a timely petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to LC.§ 194901. Once the State or the defendant allows the time for appeal to expire without challenging
the District Court's jurisdiction in the case, absent something like a properly filed Rule 35
motion or petition for post-conviction relief, the question ofjurisdiction may not be heard.
Wegner, supra.
The State chose not to appeal from the June 9, 2010, sentence. Therefore, it cannot now
assert that the Court was without jurisdiction to enter that sentence. Id.
B. The State's Jurisdictional Argument Is Further Precluded Bv The Doctrines Of
Invited Error and Judicial Estoppel
Not only is there no jurisdiction to hear the State's belated claims about the June 2010

2

sentence, but the claims are also precluded by the doctrines of invited error and judicial estoppel.
At the hearing on June 9, 20 I 0, the District Com1 began with a review of the case and
stated, "So this Court's function appears to be, if there is in fact a certified North Dakota
judgment, then the Court simply would then, upon review of that, would again impose the
sentence and move on from there." Tr. 6/9/10, p. 2, In. 2-6. The Court then asked both Mr.
Moore and the State whether they agreed with this assessment. Tr. 6/9/10, p. 2, In. 6-7.
Mr. Moore stated that his objection remained to the use of the North Dakota case because
he had never been convicted of DUI in North Dakota and stated that it was his view that because
the conviction in the other case had been vacated, he should be allowed to withdraw his plea in
this case and proceed to trial. Tr. 6/9/10, p. 2, In. 9 - p. 3, In. 2.
The State replied, "And, in fact, we think that this Court's review of this is fine." Tr.
619110, p. 3, In. 8-9. The State never objected that the Court was without jurisdiction to impose

sentence. Tr. 6/9/10.
The Court, with no objection from the State, imposed a sentence of one year fixed with
four years indeterminate for five years. In imposing the sentence, the Court yet again gave the
State an opportunity to object to its jurisdiction by specifically asking the parties if either had
anything else to say. Tr. 6/9/10, p. 7, In. 2-4. And the State responded, "No, Your Honor." Tr.
619110, p. 7, In. 5.

The State then sat silent throughout the 42-day time period allowed for an appeal. ROA.

It was only in October 2010, that the State made any peep at all about the June 9,2010,
sentence. And, at that time, the State did not argue that the June sentence was imposed outside
the Court's jurisdiction. Rather, the State filed "State's Motion to Correct Judgment of
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Conviction and to Clarify Credit for Time Served." R 34-37. Nowhere in this pleading did the
State dispute the Court's jurisdiction to enter the June 9, 20 l Ojudgment. Id.
Further, during oral argument on the motion, the State never mentioned any argument that
the District Court was without jurisdiction to enter the June 9, 2010 judgment. Tr. 10/7/10.
Idaho courts have long held that 'one may not successfully complain of errors one
has consented to or acquiesced in. In other words, invited errors are not
reversible.' State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222,226, 706 P.2d 456,460 (1985); State
v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 673 P.2d 436 (1983). The doctrine of invited error
applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his own conduct induces the
commission of the error. People v. Perez, 23 Cal.3d 545, 153 Cal.Rptr. 40, 591
P .2d 63, 66, n. 3 (Cal. 1979).

State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,819,864 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1993).
Similarly,
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one
position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,252, 92 P.3d 492,502 (2004). The Idaho
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76
Idaho 87,277 P.2d 561 (1954).

A &]Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,684,116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005).
In this case, both invited error and the doctrine of judicial estoppel apply. The State
adopted the position on June 10, 2010, that the District Court hadjurisdiction to impose
sentence. The State specifically told the Court that its intention to impose sentence was "fine."
Having taken that position, the State cannot now take the opposite position and argue that the
Court was without jurisdiction. Atkinson, supra; A & J Const., supra.
Ultimately, the doctrine of invited error serves several purposes, one of which is that of
judicial efficiency. See State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct.App. 2000)
(purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an important role in
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prompting an error in the trial court from later challenging the error on appeal). See also, State v.
Rollins, No. 3 7688, Court of Appeals, Slip Opinion July 19, 2011, page 11, ftnt. 4, "In short,
invited errors are not reversible." Judicial efficiency is not served if parties can invite errors, not
appeal, wait until the case is final, and then belatedly ask the District Court or this Court to find
reversible error.
Likewise, the doctrine of judicial estoppel serves several purposes. "One purpose of the
doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the orderly administration
of justice and having regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. The doctrine is also intended
to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the courts." Robertson Supply, Inc. v.
Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,101,952 P.2d 914,915 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted) cited
with favor in A & J Const., 141 Idaho at 685, 116 P.3d at 15.
Throughout the proceedings in this case, the State acquiesced in, actively agreed to, and
urged the District Court's exercise of jurisdiction on June 9,2010, in imposing sentence on Mr.
Moore. By the doctrines of invited error and judicial estoppel, the State is now estopped from
claiming that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to sentence Mr. Moore in June 2010.
Atkinson, supra; A & J Const. supra.
The doctrines of invited error and judicial estoppel should be applied in this case because
to do otherwise allows the State to essentially appeal the June 9,2010, sentence without having
obtained this Court's jurisdiction through the timely filing of a notice of appeal. This would set a
precedent encouraging parties to sit on jurisdictional objections until long after the case is final
and then raise them, not through the allowed means of a Rule 35 motion or a petition for postconviction relief, but as part of a motion in the District Court not sanctioned by any of the
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applicable rules. This would nullify IAR 14. This practice outside the Criminal Rules and the
Appellate Rules would serve no one's interests - not the Courts' and not Mr. Moore's and
ultimately not the State's. The State surely has no interest in establishing a precedent whereby
parties can endlessly bring actions outside the rules. 1

1

The State also never previously raised two additional points which it now asserts in its
Respondent's Brief.
At page 2 of its brief, the State asserts that Mr. Moore did not raise the authentication
issue in this case on appeal. The State misreads both Mr. Moore's prior briefing and the Court of
Appeals' decision when it makes this belated claim. In his briefing in Case No. 36033, Mr.
Moore requested consolidation with Case No. 35486 and stated that he "incorporates all briefing
submitted on his behalf in that case into this case in full." Case No. 36033, Appellant's Opening
Brief at page 15 (emphasis added). There was no exclusion of the authentication issue. And, the
Court of Appeals specifically stated in its opinion in Case No. 36033, "In the second case
consolidated in this appeal, Moore again challenges the use of his North Dakota conviction as the
basis for enhancement of his DUI charge, incorporating by reference the assertions made in the
appellant's brief for Case No. 35486." State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 36033,887, 899,231 P.3d 532,
544 (Ct. App. 2010). Again, there was no exclusion of the authentication issue. Indeed, if the
authentication issue was not raised in this case, the Court of Appeals would never have remanded
the case on the basis of its decision on that issue in the other case.
Also, in footnote 1, page 3, of its brief, the State asserts for the first time that the Rule 11
plea agreement said nothing about the plea in Case No. 36033 being conditional on the appeal in
Case No. 36486. However, at the plea hearing, the District Court stated that the plea was
conditional on the appellate court not reversing on either the issue of speedy trial or the issue of
the use of the North Dakota conviction. Tr. 12/1/08, p. 79, ln. 8-13. And, after defense counsel
reiterated that the use of the North Dakota conviction was on appeal in the other case and that the
outcome of that appeal would control in this case, the prosecutor said, "It is correct, Judge.
Thank you." Tr. 12/1/08, p. 78, ln. 1 - 7.
These new claims should be disregarded because they are inconsistent with the record.
Further, the State is improperly raising them for the first time on appeal. State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 224, 245 P .3d 961, 976 (2010), holds that when an alleged error has not been properly
preserved for appeal through objection in the lower court, the appellate court's authority to
remedy the error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.
As the State is making no claim that Mr. Moore was denied his Fourteenth Amendment rights, it
may not now raise its new claims for the first time on appeal.
6

III. CONCLUSION
The State cannot now raise any argument that the District Court was without jurisdiction
on June 9, 2010. Such an argument is precluded both because this Court lacks jurisdiction to
hear it and because it violates the doctrines of invited error and judicial estoppel. Except for the
jurisdictional argument, the State has not argued that the sentence of October 7,2010, should
stand. See Respondent's Brief. Therefore, Mr. Moore asks that the judgment of October 7,
2010, be voided and that the judgment of June 9, 2010, be reinstated.

J

Respectfully submitted this

J- day of September, 2011.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Albert Moore
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